I'm a PhD student in philosophy at New York University. I work primarily in epistemology (traditional, formal, and inquiry) and metaethics, and also have significant interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metasemantics.
Before coming to NYU, I completed an MPhil in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. Before that, I got my A.B. in Philosophy at Harvard College.
I am, on one side, an 江戸っ子 (edokko).
My dissertation concerns the normative significance of (in)coherence, broadly construed to include things like logical inconsistency, akrasia, failures of instrumental rationality, and non-probabilistic credences, as well as more inchoate notions like being confused, hypocritical, or at war with oneself.
Incoherence and Analyticity [forthcoming in Philosophical Studies]
A paper on success in inquiry
A paper on formal epistemologists' immodesty principle [handout]
A paper developing an account of incoherence as tension among someone's commitments for which we hold them responsible
A paper on epistemic responsibility
Logic | Autumn 2024
Nature of Values (Metaethics) | Summer 2024
Epistemology | Summer 2023
Metaphysics | Summer 2022
Logic | Summer 2020
Modal Logic | Autumn 2023
Metaphysics | Autumn 2022
Ethics and Society | Spring 2022
Political Philosophy | Autumn 2021